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We examine the relationship between elections, political connections, and cash holdings in 
Ghanaian local assemblies. Using a panel dataset of 179local assemblies over a period 2012 to 
2017, a panel regression and the generalized method of moments estimation techniques was 
employed for the analysis. We find that local assemblies hold less cash during election years, 
which suggests that election may be one of the potential factors to mitigate agency conflict in 
weak governance environment. Further, we demonstrate that local assemblies that have political 
connections hold less cash; however, political uncertainty makes these entities conducive to 
agency problems than their non-connected peers because they hold more cash. Additional 
analysis indicates that one year prior to elections, managerial conservatism kicks-in and leads 
managers to hold more cash in local assemblies that have political connections, which continues 
and becomes more pronounced in election years. Our results have implications for regulations on 
the cash management practices of local assemblies. 










Political uncertainty and connections have immense consequences for corporate outcomes 
and decisions. In the US, for example, election years are observed to have an adverse effect on 
cost of corporate bonds relative to nonelection years by 34 basis point, on average(Waisman, Ye, 
& Zhu, 2015), while Chinese firms hold significantly less cash during political uncertainties 
caused by turnovers in local political leadership(Xu, Chen, Xu, & Chan, 2016). Political 
connections, although defined differently by different authors, is argued to be either formal or 
informal ties between firms and politicians. Political connections have associated costs and 
benefits. From the benefit perspective, available empirical evidence documents a significantly 
lower effective tax rates (Adhikari, Derashid, & Zhang, 2006), increased propensity of initial 
public offerings (IPOs) success at a reduced cost (Bao, Johan, & Kutsuna, 2016), easier access to 
credit (Chen, Shen, & Lin, 2014; Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008) and improved performance 
(Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2012; Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2011). From the cost perspective, 
firms that have political connections have higher leverage, increase likelihood of losses and 
negative equity (Bliss & Gul, 2012) and poorer earnings quality (Chaney, Faccio, & Parsley, 
2011). 
However, this evidence has only been observed in profit firms broadly based in the US, and 
emerging markets in Asia. In the context of nonprofit firms or governmental organizations, we 
observe that no study has examined how elections and political connections affect cash holdings. 
We fill this void by focusing on the relation between elections, political connections, and cash 
holdings in metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies (hereafter referred to as, local 
assemblies) in Ghana to provide an understanding of the cash management practices in local 
assemblies, specifically, in sub-Saharan Africa. Unlike other nonprofit firms, local assemblies 
are an extension of the central government. By statues, 70% of its membership is elected, while 
the remaining 30% are appointed by the central government, led by a presidentially appointed 
chief executive officer (CEO). These CEOs are local operatives of the incumbent party and 
entrenched bureaucrats whose decisions are biased toward political expediencies. This makes 




From a theoretical perspective, factors that stimulate agency problems appear to be the 
dominant underlying feature that characterizes cash management policies in nonprofit firms 
(Fisman & Hubbard, 2005; Lee & Woronkowicz, 2019). The reason being that, nonprofit firms 
are characterized by a weak governance environment (Core, Guay, & Verdi, 2006; Gore, 2009; 
Ramirez, 2011). Therefore, nonprofit firms with more cash balances exhibit greater agency 
problems. However, the empirical evidence of cash holdings as a function of agency problem is 
mixed (Calabrese & Gupta, 2019; Gore, 2009; Lee & Woronkowicz, 2019).A competing interest 
exist as to the role of political uncertainty in cash holdings. On the one hand, cash holding is 
expected to be higher in the face of political uncertainty because of the tendency to increased 
managerial conservatism (Feng & Rao, 2018; Phan, Nguyen, Nguyen, & Hegde, 2019). On the 
other hand, CEOs of local assemblies are centrally appointed and in theory, if the appointing 
government wins, then CEOs retain their jobs and safeguard their political career. Conversely, if 
the appointing government loses, then their tenure as CEOs also ends. Consequently, the need to 
stabilize their regime and keep them in power would enable local assemblies relieve their 
resources constraints to reduce cash holdings. This is so because, for the CEOs of local 
assemblies, the opportunity cost for investment in liquid assets is higher during election years 
than in nonelection years.  
Existing studies on cash holdings in politically connected firms reveals inconclusive results. 
Empirical evidence in the US suggests that, because of the reduced benefit of cash reverse, firms 
that have political connections hold less cash (Hill, Fuller, Kelly, & Washam, 2014). This result 
is consistent in an international sub-sample of politically connected firms in eight (8) emerging 
markets or countries with high levels of corruption (Kusnadi, 2019). Conversely, single country 
studies in China and Pakistan document that agency problems lead to cash hoarding in firms that 
have political connections(Lin, Chang, Yu, & Kao, 2019; Saeed, Belghitar, & Clark, 2014). In 
the context of local assemblies, we argue that, although, cash holding is a function of agency 
problems (Core et al., 2006; Gore, 2009), there should be little or no conflict of interest or 
competing interest between the two main political actors (i.e., the CEO and member of 
parliament (MP)) of local assemblies that have political connections to the central government 
through party affiliation because of their quest to stabilize their regime and keep them in power. 
As such, they face reduced benefits of cash reserves, suggesting a potential lower risk of 
expropriation than their non-connected peers. 
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Using a panel dataset of 179 local assemblies over the period 2012-2017, we find that local 
assemblies hold less cash during election years, which suggests that election, may be one of the 
potential factors to mitigate agency conflict in weak governance environment. Further, we show 
that political connections in local assemblies leads to reduced cash holdings; however, political 
uncertainty makes these entities conducive to agency problems than their non-connected peers 
because they hold more cash during election years. Additional analysis indicates that one year 
prior to elections, managerial conservatism kicks-in and leads managers to hold more cash in 
local assemblies that have political connections, which continues and becomes more pronounced 
in election years.  
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the 
determinants of cash holdings in governmental organizations (Calabrese & Gupta, 2019; Core et 
al., 2006; Gore, 2009; Lee & Woronkowicz, 2019; Ramirez, 2011) by showing that elections and 
political connections significantly underscore cash holding levels. Second, we contribute to the 
agency conflict emanating from free cash flow (see Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990) by providing 
evidence that suggest elections may improve the practices of managers expropriating excess cash 
to the social interest of their locality as opposed to their own self-interested and perquisites 
consumption. Third, we contribute to the debate on the role of political connections (Chen, El 
Ghoul, Guedhami, & Nash, 2018; Chkir, Gallali, & Toukabri, 2020) by showing that local 
assemblies that have political connections hold less cash, however, political uncertainty makes 
these entities conducive to agency problems than their non-connected peers because they hold 
more cash during election years.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature. Section 3 
describes the data and methods. Section4 presents the empirical results and discussions. Finally, 
section 5 concludes and discusses the implications of the study. 
 
2. Related Literature 
2.1.Election and cash holdings 
The first research question that this study deals with is the relationship between elections and 
cash holdings. This strand of literature is associated with the impact of political uncertainty on 
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corporate outcomes and decisions. In this section, we briefly report the main findings obtained 
on the impact of political uncertainty on corporate outcomes and decisions. 
Election years are period of intense political uncertainty. The literature on the impact of 
political uncertainty demonstrates a number of consequences on corporate decisions. For 
example, Julio and Yook (2012) examine how national elections shape corporate investment 
decision in 48 countries. They find that, during election years, firms spend significantlylesson 
investment by an average of 4.8 percentage points relative to nonelection years. In the US, 
Waisman et al. (2015) provide empirical evidence of the relation between political uncertainty 
and cost of corporate bonds and find that political uncertainty significantly increases cost of 
corporate bonds. In other words, election years have an adverse effect on cost of corporate bonds 
relative to nonelection years by 34 basis points, on average. 
A number of studies have provided information on how political uncertainty influence 
corporate outcomes in emerging economies. An et al. (2016) examine how turnovers in local 
political leadership in China affect corporate investment decisions. They find a significant 
reduction in firms’ investments in the face political uncertainties caused by turnovers in local 
political leaders. Li et al. (2018) examine the cost of equity capital for firms in China around 
political uncertainty. They find that, when facing political uncertainty, it is expensive to raise 
equity capital. Simply put, political uncertainty increases cost of equity capital. This adverse 
effect is conditional on the amount of government subsidies received by a firm or when the top 
management team is politically connected. 
A study of Chinese listed firms by Chen et al. (2018) examines the relationship between 
political uncertainty, caused by turnovers of local government leaders, and the firm’s information 
environment. They find a reduced level of idiosyncratic information about a firm in the market 
during periods of political uncertainty. The adverse effect is more prevalent when firms have a 
high level of political dependence. In a related study, Xu et al. (2016) examine whether political 
uncertainty affects cash holdings for Chinese firms. Using political uncertainty created by 
political turnover in a city government, they find that firms hold less cash. Further, they 
demonstrate that the reduced cash holdings are more pronounced if (1) the newly appointed 
official is not an indigene of the city, (2) it faces high risk of political extraction, and (3) it has 
strong twin agency conflicts. 
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This brief survey of the literature suggests that political uncertainty caused by elections or 
turnover in local political leadership, has immense consequences for corporate outcomes and 
decisions. Yet, this evidence has only been observed in profit firms broadly based in the US and 
China. In the context of nonprofit firms or governmental organizations, we observe that no study 
has examined how elections affect cash holdings. In summary, we fill this void by focusing on 
how elections impact cash holdings in local assemblies in Ghana to provide an understanding of 
the influence of political uncertainty on cash management practices in local assemblies, 
specifically, in a sub-Saharan African country. 
2.2.Political connections and cash holdings 
The second research question that this study deals with is the relationship between political 
connections and cash holdings. This strand of literature is associated with the impact of political 
connections on corporate outcomes and decisions. In this section, we briefly report the main 
findings obtained on the impact of political connections on corporate outcomes and decisions.       
The literature investigating cash holdings as a function of political connections has been 
mixed. Empirical evidence in the US suggests that firms with political connections derive a 
reduced benefit from excessive cash holdings leading to reduced cash levels. Using lobbying 
expenses as a measure of political connections, Hill et al. (2014) examine the effect of political 
connections on corporate liquidity. The results show political connections negatively affect cash 
levels. In an international setting, Kusnadi (2019) examine the value of cash holdings as a 
function of political connections. The results demonstrate that political connections reduce the 
value of cash holdings and this is conditioned by the level of economic development and 
corruption as well as connections with large shareholders. 
The few studies conducted in emerging economies suggest that agency problems lead 
connected firms to accumulate large amount of cash. Lin et al. (2019) investigate the impact of 
political connections on the cash holdings of firms listed on Chinese stock exchanges. They 
apply panel data regression analysis and find political connections to be positively correlated 
with cash holdings. They demonstrate that firms with both political connections and business 
group affiliations hold more cash. Saeed et al. (2014) examine the effects that political 
connections have on cash holdings. Using data on Pakistani firms over the period 2002-2010, 
they find that connected firms hold significantly larger cash reserves than their non-connected 
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counterparts. In a cross-country study, Boubakri, Ghoul and Saffar (2013) examine how 
politically connected firms that are characterized by acute corporate governance problems 
manage their cash levels. They find that political connections are conducive for agency 
problems, resulting in cash buildup. 
The above brief narrative suggests that political connections have immense consequences for 
corporate outcomes and decisions. Yet, this evidence has only been observed in profit firms 
broadly based in the US and emerging markets. In the context of nonprofit firms or governmental 
organizations, we observe that no study has examined how political connection affects cash 
holdings. In summary, we fill this void by focusing on how political connections influence cash 
holdings in local assemblies to provide an understanding of the influence political connections 
on cash management practices in local assemblies, specifically, in a sub-Saharan African 
country. 
 
3. Method and Data 
3.1.Empirical method and model specification 
In this study, we adopt the ordinary least squares (OLS)regression with region and year fixed 
effects as the primary estimation method. This is consistent with our dataset. The test statistics 
from the Hausman test between panel fixed and random effects indicated that fixed effects 
regression was appropriate. However, our variables of interest (i.e., elections and political 
connections) are binary variables taking the values of either 1 or 0. Also, we are minded of the 
need for policy relevance, robustness of the findings, and comparability with prior studies. 
Across all specifications, we report t-statistics which we adjust for robust standard errors 
clustered on assembly. In order to control for the presence of extreme data points, we winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% of the distribution for all continuous variables. We lagged the control 
variables to account for possible endogeneity from reverse causality. Following prior studies 
(e.g., Core et al. 2006; Gore 2009), we examine the relationship between elections, political 
connections and cash holdings by specifying a heteroscedastic robust OLS model with standard 
errors clustered at assembly level as follows: 
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𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑌𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑊𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−17𝑗=3 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡               (1) 
The dependent variable𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is defined as the natural logarithm of cash and cash equivalent to 
total assets of assembly i in year t. 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑌𝑟𝑡 equals 1 if year t was election year (i.e., years 2012 
and 2016) and 0 otherwise. 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 denotes political connection which equals 1 if the CEO 
and MP are affiliated with the governing political party. W is a vector of four firm level 
characteristics (size, leverage, investment, income diversification index) identified in the 
literature to affect cash management practices (see Table 1 for complete variable definitions). 𝜇𝑖represents Region Dummies to remove the effect of any unobservable time-invariant cross-
sectional difference across regions, 𝜆𝑡 represents Year Dummies to remove the effect of any year-
specific common shocks and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
Table 1. Variables definitions 
Variable Definition 
Primary measure of cash holdings 
Ln(Cash/TA) Natural logarithm of cash and cash equivalent over total assets. 
Alternative proxies of cash holdings  
Cash/TA Cash and cash equivalent over total assets. 
Cash1/TA 1+Cash and cash equivalent over total assets. 
Cash/Rev Cash and cash equivalent over total revenue 
Cash1/Rev 1+Cash and cash equivalent over total revenue. 
Cash/TA100 Cash and cash equivalent over total assets as a percentage. 
Cash/Rev100 Cash and cash equivalent over total revenue as a percentage. 
Ln(Cash/TA100) Natural logarithm of cash and cash equivalent over total assets as 
a percentage. 
Ln(Cash/Rev100) Natural logarithm of cash and cash equivalent over total revenue 
as a percentage. 
Independent variables 
 
Electyr Equals 1 if year t was election year and 0 otherwise. 
Political Politically connection equals 1 if at the CEO and the member of 
parliament (MP) are affiliated with governing political party.          
 
LnSize Natural logarithm of the total assets. 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities to net assets. 
Investratio The ratio of total investment to total assets. 
Incdivindex Revenue diversification index and calculated as the product of 
the fraction of total revenue from each source (i.e., government 




3.2.Data and sample 
The sample consists of 179 local assemblies across the ten (10) administrative regions in 
Ghana with annual financial data from 2012 to 2017. The number of sampled assemblies and 
periodicity are motivated by constraints in data availability. Our main data source is the report of 
the Auditor General on the accounts of local assemblies for the financial year ended 
31stDecember 2012 to 31stDecember 2017, submitted to the Parliament of Ghana. We sourced 
for this report from the Ghana Audit Service website at www.ghaudit.org.   
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of all key variables for our sample. The main variable, 
cash holding measured as Cash/TA, has a mean (median) of 0.87 (0.98), which is significantly 
higher than that of nonprofit firms in the prior studies (see for example, Gore, 2009). This result 
indicates that the assets mix of local assemblies is dominated by cash, which increases their risk 
of political extraction. The mean of Electyr is 0.33, indicating that elections took place in a third 
of the sample period. The mean of Political is 0.64, which signifies that more than half of 
sampled local assemblies have political connections during the sample period.  
Table 2.Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. P25 Mdn P75     
Cash/TA 1023 0.87 0.31 0.85 0.98 1.00 
Electyr 1026 0.33 0.47 0 0 1.00 
Political 1026 0.64 0.48 0 1.00 1.00 
LnSize 1023 12.92 1.13 12.39 13.05 13.59 
Leverage 1026 0.62 8.47 0 0.01 0.07 
Investratio 1023 0.12 0.22 0 0.01 0.12 
Incdivindex 1016 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.13 
Notes. This table provides the descriptive statistics of variables. The full sample consists of 179 local assemblies from 
2012 to 2017. Obs= number of observations; Std.Dev.=standard deviations; P25=25th percentile; Mdn=median value; 
P75=75th percentile. The variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
The mean (median) assembly size is 12.92 (12.39) in natural logarithm terms. The mean and 
median values of Leverage are 0.62 and 0.01, respectively.  The mean leverage is much higher 
than the median, suggesting that leverage is highly skewed. In Ghana, many local assemblies do 
not favor debt financing, while some take on extremely high debt finance. Additionally, the 
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mean investment (0.12) is much higher than the median (0.01), suggesting that many local 
assemblies do not invest, while some have extremely high investment. The results also indicate 
that investment is highly skewed. The mean and median values of income diversification index 
(Incidvindex) are 0.10 and 0.08, respectively. Given that a higher value of Incdivindex indicates 
highly limited revenue sources, the results show that local assemblies in Ghana have a low 
limitation on revenue sources. 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of the variables used in the regression 
analysis. We engaged in this analysis to test for the presence of a possible multicollinearity 
between the independent variables. The results show no concern over a possible multicollinearity 
problem in the independent variables as all correlation coefficients are below 0.50. 
Table 3.Correlation coefficients 
 Ln(Cash/TA) Electyr Political Lsize Leverage Investratio Incdivindex 
Ln(Cash/TA) 1.000       
Electyr -0.106 1.000      
Political -0.005 0.007 1.000     
LnSize  0.074 -0.239 0.006 1.000    
Leverage  -0.003 -0.022 -0.012 -0.058 1.000   
Investratio  -0.631 0.197 -0.029 -0.160 -0.013 1.000  
Incdivindex  -0.046 -0.066 -0.182 0.175 0.012 0.065 1.000 
Notes. This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of all variables for the sample assemblies. The variables are 
defined in Table 1. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1.Election, political connections, and cash holdings 
Table 4 provides the baseline OLS estimates of the effect of elections and political 
connections on cash holdings in local assemblies. Model 1 in Table 4 presents results of the 
baseline estimates of the relationship between election, political and cash holdings in Ghanaian 
local assemblies. The overall impression from the results is that local assemblies hold less cash 
during election years. The results indicate that the coefficient of Election year on Ln(Cash/TA) is 
negative and significant at the 99% confidence level. This result suggests that, during election 
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years, local assemblies will have a decrease of 65.8% in cash holdings. This result may indicate 
that (1) elections help local assemblies relieve their resource constraints to reduce cash holdings 
and invest in developmental projects in order to maintain partisan loyalty of voters which should 
help to entrench their electoral coalition in the long run (Aytaç, 2014), (2) the significantly 
reduced cash holdings may indicate that local assemblies have a higher opportunity cost for 
investment in liquid assets during election years (Kim, Mauer, & Sherman, 1998), and (3) 
growth opportunities may not be strong in local assemblies during election years, resulting in a 
relatively lower cash holdings (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999; Pinkowitz & 
Williamson, 2001). This conclusion is supported by the role of government funding in restricting 
growth opportunities in nonprofit firms (Guo, 2007; Lecy & Searing, 2015). 
Table 4.Elections, Political Connections and Cash Holdings: Baseline Estimates 
Dependent variables Ln(Cash/TA) Excess Cash 
 (1) (2) 
   
Electyr -0.658*** -0.281*** 
 (-4.64) (-2.80) 
Political -0.147*** -0.034 
 (-2.97) (-0.70) 
Lsize(t-1) -0.087*** 0.149*** 
 (-4.21) (7.33) 
Leverage(t-1) -0.094 -0.053 
 (-1.65) (-0.87) 
Linvestratio(t-1) -0.046*** 0.187*** 
 (-3.51) (13.75) 
Incdivindex(t-1) 0.465 0.781 
 (0.75) (1.62) 
Constant 0.176 -1.802*** 
 (0.70) (-7.26) 
Region fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Fisher 9.67*** 22.98*** 
R2 0.202 0.334 
Adjusted R2 0.184 0.319 
Observations 803 798 
Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results of elections and political connections on cash holdings. 
The variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions control for region and year fixed effects. t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors with clustering at the assembly level. ***, **, and * indicate 




Concerning the effect of political connections on cash holdings, we find that local assemblies 
that are politically connected hold less cash. The results indicate that the coefficient of Political 
connections on Ln(Cash/TA ) is negative and significant at the 99% confidence level, suggesting 
that apolitically connected local assembly will have a reduction in cash holdings of 14.7%. This 
finding is consistent with prior studies (Chen et al., 2018) that document that politically 
connected firms benefit from soft-budget constraints and are less likely to suffer from liquidity 
constraints. This results may also indicate that political connections accentuate the weaker  
corporate governance structures of local assemblies, resulting in lower cash holdings (Harford, 
Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008).Su, Fung, Huang, and Shen (2014)also noted that one of the potential 
benefits of political connections is a lower risk of expropriation as politically connected firms 
pay higher cash dividend. From this perspective, politically connected local assemblies may hold 
less cash, suggesting a potential benefit of a lower risk of expropriation than their non-connected 
peers (Batta, Sucre Heredia, & Weidenmier, 2014). 
The results also indicate that two control variables have a significant effect on cash holdings 
in local assemblies. From Model 1 in Table 4, the coefficient on assembly size (LnSize) is 
negative and significant at 1% levels. The significant negative effect of assembly size on cash 
holdings may imply that larger assemblies hold less cash because they have other resources that 
can substitute for cash at the assembly. Second, investment ratio has a negative and significant 
effect on cash holdings in local assemblies at a 1% level. The decreased cash holdings effect of 
investment (LnInvestratio) may imply that investment substitute for cash holdings in local 
assemblies. 
Model 2 in Table 4 provides further analysis on the role elections and political connections in 
reducing excess cash holdings. The free cash flow perspective suggests that manager’s access to 
free cash flow provides the incentives to engage in self-interested utility maximization as well as 
perquisites consumption to the detriment of shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). 
Consequently, shareholders protect their interest by limiting manager’s access to free cash flow. 
Our results regarding the negative effect of election on cash holdings in local assemblies may 
suggest that election is one of the potential factors to mitigate agency conflict. We validate this 
conjecture by investigating the effect of election on excess cash holdings in local assemblies. We 
rely on extensive prior studies and consider excess cash holdings as the difference between cash 
holding at time t and the optimal cash level at time t. To determine the optimal cash level, we 
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follow Opler et al. (1999) and estimate the model: Cash =f(assembly size, leverage, investment 
ratio, income diversification index, region dummies, year dummies). We replicate the primary 
analysis using excess cash as the dependent variable and present the results in Table 4, model 2. 
The coefficient of election year on excess cash is negative and significant at the 1% 
confidence level. This finding supports that election may improve the practices of managers 
expropriating excess cash to the social interest of their locality as opposed to their own self-
interest and perquisites consumption. Consistent with the literature on cash holdings and country 
corporate governance (Dittmar, Mahrt-smith, & Servaes, 2003; Kalcheva & Lins, 2007; 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 2006), whenever the rights of shareholders are better protected, 
managers are led to hold less cash. From this perspective, we conclude that election may offer 
one of the potential conditions that ensure that social interests and rights are better protected in 
local assemblies. However, the coefficient of political connections on excess cash is negative but 
insignificant. This finding indicates that political connections are necessary but not sufficient 
condition to reduce excess cash holdings.  
 
4.2.Effect of the complementarity between elections and political connections 
The prior section reports reduced cash holdings in local assemblies that have political 
connections. However, Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) report that uncertainty increases 
managerial conservatism resulting in cash buildup. Given that CEOs of local assemblies are 
centrally appointed, election years are periods of intense political uncertainty. From this 
perspective, elections may condition cash buildup in politically connected local assemblies. We 
examine the moderating effect of elections on the relationship between political connections and 
cash holdings by estimating the regression: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 × 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑊𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−18𝑗=4 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (2) 
The dependent variable is cash holdings, measured as Cash/TA. We control for the association 
between cash holdings and firm characteristics using assembly size, leverage, investment, and 
income diversification index (see Table 1 for complete variable definitions). We use ordinary 
least squares regression with region fixed effects and year fixed effects controls. Additionally, t-
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statistics are based on standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
assembly level. 
 
Table 5.Interaction of Election and Political Connections on Cash Holdings 
Dependent variable Ln(Cash/TA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Electyr  -0.453*** -1.175*** -1.194*** -1.265*** -1.262*** 
 (-3.71) (-4.07) (-4.13) (-4.36) (-4.35) 
Political  -0.282*** -0.340*** -0.346*** -0.333*** -0.326*** 
 (-4.37) (-4.65) (-4.70) (-4.79) (-4.65) 
Electyr×Political 0.600*** 0.877*** 0.890*** 0.912*** 0.915*** 
 (3.87) (2.81) (2.87) (2.93) (2.93) 
Lsize(t-1)  -0.050** -0.066*** -0.082*** -0.088*** 
  (-2.26) (-2.92) (-3.81) (-4.02) 
Leverage(t-1)   -0.105* -0.098* -0.100* 
   (-1.80) (-1.66) (-1.70) 
Linvestratio(t-1)    -0.049*** -0.050*** 
    (-3.70) (-3.75) 
Incdivindex(t-1)      0.543 
     (0.90) 
Constant -0.556*** -0.011 0.220 0.281 0.301 
 (-6.89) (-0.04) (0.78) (1.07) (1.13) 
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Net effect of political -0.0850 -0.0506 -0.0523 -0.0317 -0.0241 
Net effect of elections -0.0690 -0.6137 -0.9440 -0.6813 -0.6764 
Fisher 6.91*** 6.23*** 5.39*** 9.49*** 9.00*** 
R2 0.179 0.218 0.227 0.240 0.240 
Adjusted R2 0.166 0.202 0.210 0.223 0.222 
Observations 1,023 809 809 809 803 
Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results of the moderating role elections play in the relationship between 
political connections and cash holdings. The variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions control for region and year 
fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors with clustering at the assembly level. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5 reports the moderating effect of elections on the relationship between political 
connections and cash holdings. In interactive regressions, in order to assess the overall effect of 
the modulating variables, net effects are computed as in contemporary literature (Asongu, Le 
Roux, & Biekpe, 2017; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018). The net effects are computed as the sum 
of the unconditional and conditional or interactive effect. For example, from Model 5 in Table 5, 
the net effect from the interaction between elections and political connections on cash holdings is 
-0.0241 [(0.915×0.33)+(-0.326)]. In the computation, 0.915 is the conditional effect from the 
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intersection of elections and political connections, 0.33 is the mean value of sample election 
years, and -0.326 is the unconditional effect of political connections. Similarly, the net effect of 
elections on cash holdings is -0.6764 [(0.915×0.64)+(-1.262)] from Model 5 in Table 5. In the 
computation, 0.915 is the conditional effect from the intersection of elections and political 
connections, 0.64 is the mean value of sample political connections, and -1.262 is the 
unconditional effect of elections on cash holdings. These results are consistent with the 
established findings discussed earlier. 
 
4.3.Political connections and evolution of cash holdings 
The prior section reports greater cash holdings in local assemblies that have political connections 
because of political uncertainty. However, it is not clear how cash buildup persists. We examine 
the evolution of cash holdings by estimating the regression: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑊𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−17𝑗=3 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          (3) 
The dependent variable is cash holdings, measured as Cash/TA and Excess_Cash. We control for 
the association between cash holdings and firm characteristics using assembly size, leverage, 
investment, and income diversification index (see Table 1 for complete variable definitions). We 
use ordinary least squares regression with region fixed effects and year fixed effects controls. 
Additionally, t-statistics are based on standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and 













Table 6.Political Connections and Evolution of Cash Holdings 
Dependent variables Ln(Cash/TA) Excess Cash 
 (1) (2) 
   
Political -0.428*** -0.073 
 (-4.14) (-0.82) 
Political×2013 0.101 -0.129 
 (1.12) (-1.08) 
Political×2014 0.127 -0.173 
 (1.50) (-1.53) 
Political×2015 0.176** -0.024 
 (2.45) (-0.20) 
Political×2016 1.016*** 0.541** 
 (3.05) (2.51) 
Lsize(t-1) -0.088*** 0.148*** 
 (-4.02) (6.89) 
Leverage(t-1) -0.100* -0.060 
 (-1.67) (-0.96) 
Linvestratio(t-1) -0.051*** 0.185*** 
 (-3.82) (13.06) 
Incdivindex(t-1) 0.526 0.856* 
 (0.87) (1.79) 
Constant 0.366 -1.763*** 
 (1.36) (-6.48) 
Region fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Fisher 8.12*** 22.52*** 
R2 0.241 0.356 
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.338 
Observations 803 798 
Notes: This table presents the OLS regression results of the evolution of cash holdings in local assemblies 
that have political connections. The variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions control for region and 
year fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors with clustering at the 
assembly level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6 reports the results of estimating equation (3). Model (1) shows that local assemblies 
that have political connections exhibit relative increase in cash holdings beginning in 2015 and 
continues through 2016.When we replicate the results in Model (2) using Excess_Cash as 
dependent variable, we find that this effect is prevalent only in the year 2016. Overall, the 
evidence in Table 6 indicates that one year prior to elections, managerial conservatism kicks-in 
and leads managers to hold more cash in local assemblies that have political connections, which 






4.4.1. Controlling for endogeneity 
This study follows recent literature and adopts dynamic panel system Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) to control for all potential sources of possible endogeneity problem driving the 
relationship between elections and cash holdings.  
 
Table 7.Robustness Results from the Dynamic Panel System GMM Approach 
Dependent variable Ln(Cash/TA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Electyr  -0.945*** -0.616* -0.590* -0.531* -0.705** 
 (-2.65) (-1.83) (-1.78) (-1.66) (-2.25) 
Political  0.759** 0.527 0.163 0.114 -0.058 
 (2.44) (1.23) (0.35) (0.23) (-0.75) 
Electyr×Political 0.783** 0.734** 0.536 0.622* 0.697** 
 (2.26) (2.19) (1.48) (1.84) (2.05) 
Lsize(t-1)  -0.361** -0.227 -0.341 -0.207** 
  (-2.10) (-0.97) (-1.59) (-2.38) 
Leverage(t-1)   -0.292* -0.320** -0.104 
   (-1.92) (-2.07) (-1.45) 
Linvestratio(t-1)    0.024 -0.071 
    (0.27) (-1.40) 
Incdivindex(t-1)      -2.300* 
     (-1.82) 
Cash(t-1) -0.147 -0.168 -0.207* -0.194 -0.108 
 (-1.54) (-1.47) (-1.67) (-1.46) (-1.26) 
Constant -0.790*** 3.926* 2.550 4.173 2.415** 
 (-2.76) (1.77) (0.82) (1.45) (2.38) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Net effect of political 1.0174 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Net effect of elections -0.4439 -0.1462 n/a -0.1329 -0.2589 
Fisher 11.10*** 5.47*** 4.22*** 5.25*** 9.00*** 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.436 0.648 0.174 0.104 0.909 
Hansen OIR 0.200 0.700 0.274 0.480 0.304 
No. of instruments 16 20 24 28 38 
No. of assemblies 179 179 179 179 179 
Observations 809 809 809 809 803 
Notes: This table presents the dynamic panel system GMM regression results of elections and political connection as 
well as the conditioning effect of elections on cash holdings. The variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions 
control for year fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors with clustering at the 




The dynamic panel system GMM estimator potentially helps to deal with shortcomings of 
traditional OLS estimation approach by allowing the inclusion of assembly or region fixed 
effects to account for (fixed) unobservable heterogeneity; it allows past shocks or realizations of 
cash holdings to influence elections and, should the economic process be dynamic, then it may 
be possible to account for simultaneity using some combination of variables from the 
assemblies’ history as valid instruments (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; 
Blundell & Bond, 1998).In the system GMM results, the AR(2) and Hansen OIR statistics 
indicate, respectively, that there is no second order serial correlation and that the instruments 
used are not correlated with the residuals. Additionally, the number of instruments is less than 
the number of local assemblies which makes the Hansen OIR statistics more reliable.  
 
Table 7 reports the robust dynamic panel system GMM results of the relationship between 
elections and cash holdings as well as the effect from the complementarity between elections and 
political connections in influencing cash holdings at local assemblies. Given the use of 
interactive regressions, net effects are calculated to ascertain the overall effect from the 
complementarity between elections and political connections in influencing cash holdings at 
local assemblies. For example, from Model 1 in Table 7, the net effect from the interaction 
between elections and political connections on cash holdings is 1.0174[(0.783×0.33)+(0.759)]. In 
the computation, 0.783 is the conditional effect from the intersection of elections and political 
connections, 0.33 is the mean value of sample election years, and 0.759 is the unconditional 
effect of political connections. Similarly, the net effect of elections on cash holdings is 
consistently negative from Models 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Table 7. The positive net effect of political 
connections on cash holdings is consistent with the results of Boubakri, Ghoul and Saffar (2013) 
that politically connected firms hold more cash than their non-connected peers. Our result shows 
that political uncertainty may increase managerial conservatism in politically connected local 
assemblies making these entities conducive to agency problems than their non-connected peers, 
consistent with the managerial risk aversion effect (Feng & Rao, 2018). In other words, the 
characteristics of politically connected firms such as acute agency problems and poor internal 
corporate governance mechanism (Chaney et al., 2011) come to play when they are faced with 
political uncertainty, resulting in cash buildup. Further, Faccio (2006) noted that political 
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connection leads to a potential lower risk of assets extraction by politicians. Consequently, 
politically connected local assemblies may hold more cash than their non-connected pears. From 
this perspective, the results suggest that elections may condition the potential benefit of a lower 
risk of assets extraction. On the other hand, the results show that the net effect of election on 
cash holdings is consistently negative. This result supports that election leads to reduced cash 
holdings at the local assemblies’ level. In sum, these results indicate that (1) elections help local 
assemblies relieve its resource constraints to reduce cash holdings, and (2) politically uncertainty 
condition the agency problems in local assemblies that have political connections because they 
hold more cash. 
 
4.4.2. Alternative proxies of cash holdings 
The primary analysis use Ln(Cash/TA) to measure assemblies’ cash holdings. Following 
extensive prior research, we replicate the primary analysis using eight (8) alternative proxies of 
cash holdings. These proxies are: Cash/TA, Cash1/TA, Cash/Rev, Cash1/Rev, (Cash/TA)x100, 
(Cash/Rev)x100, Ln[(Cash/TA)x100] and Ln[(Cash/Rev)x100]. Our results are robust to these 
alternative definitions of cash holdings (untabulated). 
 
5. Summary, conclusions, and implications 
In this study, we examine the relationships between elections, political connections, and cash 
holdings. For this purpose, we use a panel dataset of local assemblies in Ghana over the period of 
2012 to 2017. The empirical evidence is based on OLS regression with region and year fixed 
effects and dynamic panel system GMM. Additionally, t-statistics are based on standard errors 
that are robust to heteroskedasticity clustered at the assembly level. Several important findings 
emerge from our study.  
First, we find that elections are negatively associated with cash holdings, indicating that local 
assemblies hold less cash during election years. When examining if the observed negative effect 
of election is related to excess cash holdings, we find a consistent negative relation between 
elections and excess cash holdings. Second, we find that political connection is negatively 
associated with cash holdings. When examining if these differences are observed in excess cash 
holdings, we find a negative but insignificant relation between political connections are 
necessary but not sufficient condition to reduce excess cash holdings. Third, we have found that 
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the net effect on cash holdings is negative from the complementarity between elections and 
political connections, indicating that local assemblies that have political connections hold less 
cash than their non-connected peers. Conversely, we have also established positive net effect 
between political connections and cash holdings. When examining how cash holdings persist in 
local assemblies, we find that one year prior to elections managerial conservatism kick-ins and 
leads managers to hold more cash, which continues and becomes more pronounced in elections 
years. 
Elections may offer one of the potential conditions that ensure that social interest and rights 
are better protected in local assemblies. Second, the reduced cash holdings in local assemblies 
that have political connections, in the context of potential benefits of political connections of Su 
et al. (2014) and Batta et al. (2014), suggests a potential lower risk of expropriation than their 
non-connected peers. Third, our result suggests that political uncertainty may increase 
managerial conservatism in politically connected local assemblies making these entities 
conducive to agency problems than their non-connected peers. Fourth, the results, in the context 
of empirical evidence in Faccio (2006), suggest that elections may condition the potential benefit 
of a lower risk of assets extraction in local assemblies. 
The results presented in this study have several implications. First, our result provides 
evidence that (1) elections help local assemblies relieve resource constraints to reduce cash 
holdings, (2) local assemblies have higher opportunity cost for investment in liquid assets during 
elections years, and (3) growth opportunities may not be strong in local assemblies. This finding, 
in the context of agency conflict emanating from free cash flow, supports that elections may 
improve the practices of managers expropriating excess cash to the social interest of their locality 
as opposed to their own self-interest and perquisites consumption. Finally, the results also have 
implications for regulations on the cash management practices of local assemblies. In addition to 
determining cash buffer target (i.e., minimum cash balances) to minimize fiscal distress, the local 
government minister should consider setting maximum cash balances as well as regulate the 
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